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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate how direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of pharmaceutical products
in affected by regulations of the Food and Drug Administration and by market conditions. We focus
on a relatively under-studied segment of the pharmaceutical market -- the market for smoking
cessation products. Because of their proven effectiveness, these products could be the key to meeting
public health goals to reduce smoking. However, in many ways, smoking cessation products have
been  more  heavily regulated than cigarettes. Our empirical analysis uses data on advertising
expenditures and data from an archive of print advertisements. The archive includes all smoking
cessation product advertisements that appeared in over 13,000 issues of 28 magazines between
January 1985 and May 2002. Our study period begins shortly atfer the first nicotine replacement
product was introduced, and covers the evolution of the market as new products are introduced while
some of the older products move from prescription to over-the-counter (OTC) status. OTC status
eases the disclosure requirements imposed on advertisements of prescription pharmaceuticals,
substantially reducing the costs of a print advertisement. Our results suggest that OTC status is
associated with an increase in advertising expenditures and the number and pages of magazine
advertisements. A current proposal to reduce disclosure requirements on all DTC advertisements of
prescription drugs could have similar effects. Our results also suggest that advertising increase with
the introduction of new products and with market competition.
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adm5@cornell.edu1 For a meta-analysis, Gallet and List (2003) identify 137 estimates of the elasticity of
cigarette demand with respect to advertising expenditures.  Chaloupka and Warner (2000)
review 13 econometric studies that examine the impact of the U.S. ban on broadcast cigarette
advertising, while a smaller research literature uses pooled international data sets to study the 
impact of cigarette advertising bans (Saffer and Chaloupka 2000, Nelson 2003).   
2Chapters 3 and 7 of the 2000 Surgeon General’s Report review evidence on the
effectiveness of counter-advertising campaigns (USDHHS 2000a).  Several econometric studies
compare the impact of industry advertising versus public service counter-advertisements by
exploiting the fact that the U.S. ban on television advertising also resulted in the elimination of
anti-smoking counter-advertisements required by the Fairness Doctrine (Lewit, Coate and
Grossman 1981, Schneider, Klein and Murphy 1981). 
3Hu et al. (2000) and Keeler et al. (2002) study the aggregate sales of smoking cessation
products, while Tauras and Chaloupka (2003) use scanner data to estimate consumer demand for




Cigarette industry advertisements and anti-smoking public service campaigns are familiar
features of the U.S. mass media.  A large body of economics research investigates cigarette
advertising and the impact of regulating or even banning cigarette advertisements.
1  A similarly
large body of public health research addresses the design and impact of public service anti-
smoking campaigns.
2  The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between states and the tobacco
industry simultaneously imposed new restrictions on cigarette advertising and established new
anti-smoking media campaigns (Bulow and Klemper 1998, Gruber 2001).  In contrast to the
intense focus on other smoking-related advertisements, researchers almost seem to have
overlooked advertisements of pharmaceutical products for smoking cessation.
3   In this paper, we
empirically investigate firms’ decisions to advertise as the new market for smoking cessation
products developed.  We focus particularly on how Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulations affect these advertising decisions.   3
Our study of smoking cessation product advertisements contributes to research on
another increasingly familiar feature of U.S. mass media – direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertisements of pharmaceuticals.  The debate on whether DTC advertising leads to better or
worse consumer health care often involves analysis of the regulatory system as a whole (Mintzes
2001, 2002, Calfee 2002).  However, the benefits and costs of regulating DTC advertisements
are likely to vary greatly, depending on the medical condition the drug treats and the knowledge
base of consumers.  To improve understanding of the benefits and costs in specific contexts,
recent empirical studies focus on the impact of DTC advertising on the demand for narrow
classes of pharmaceutical products (Berndt et al. 1995, Iizuka and Jin 2002, Ling, Berndt and
Kyle 2002, Calfee, Winson and Stempski 2003, Rosenthal et al. 2003, and Wosinska 2002,
2003).  Rather than analyzing the role of DTC advertising regulations on all pharmaceuticals
broadly, or estimating the impact of DTC advertising on consumer demand, in this paper we
examine the impact of FDA regulations on firms’ advertising choices in a specific market.  In the
market we look at –  the market for pharmaceutical products approved as aids for smoking
cessation – DTC advertising plays a particularly important role: Ma et al. (2003) find that in
1998 smoking cessation was the only class of drugs primarily advertised directly to consumers,
rather than to physicians or to both consumers and physicians.    
The market for smoking cessation products is potentially very important for public
health.  A public health initiative, Healthy People 2010, aims to cut the prevalence of smoking
among adults in half, from the current rate of about 24 percent to 12 percent (USDHSS 2000b).
Over the past twenty years, the pharmaceutical industry has introduced a number of products
designed to help smokers quit.  Because of their proven effectiveness, these products could be4
the key to meeting  the Healthy People 2010 goal.  For example, Hays et al. (1999) report that
nicotine patch therapy generally doubles abstinence rates over placebo controls in both short-
and long-run follow-ups.  While recent policy debates have tended to focus on how to prevent
youth from starting to smoke, a recent analysis concludes that the Healthy People 2010 goal
cannot be met without large increases in smoking cessation rates (Mendez and Warner 2000,
2004).
Despite the potential public health significance of smoking cessation products, current
regulatory policy  towards consumer information about smoking seems disjointed.  FDA
regulation of prescription drugs results in a peculiar regulatory asymmetry:  in many ways,
smoking cessation products have been much more heavily regulated than cigarettes.    For
example, to comply with FDA regulations the typical DTC advertisement of a prescription drug
for smoking cessation includes a full extra page disclosing information on side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness.  In contrast, a cigarette advertisement only needs to include
a relatively small warning label.    The irony is that smoking cessation product advertisements
may serve some of the same public health goals as public service anti-smoking campaigns.  For
example, in 1996 the Great American Smokeout, sponsored by the American Cancer Society,
included activities in collaboration with a manufacturer of nicotine medications (Burton et al.
1997) .  More generally, previous research suggests that producers’ health claims in
advertisements are important sources of consumer information about a range of topics, including
dietary fiber in breakfast cereals (Ippolito and Mathios 1990, 1991), the fat content of foods
(Ippolito and Mathios 1995, Mathios 1998, 2000), and aspirin and heart attacks (Keith 1995). 
We contribute to this line of research by describing and analyzing the flow of producer-provided5
information about smoking cessation. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In section II we provide a brief history of the
market for smoking cessation products and its regulatory environment.  In section III, we
describe the data we use.  Our two primary sources of data are: (i) advertising expenditures by
media type; and (ii) an archive of DTC print advertisements.  The archive includes all smoking
cessation product advertisements that appeared in over 13,000 issues of 28 magazines between
January 1985 and May 2002.  Our study period begins shortly after the first nicotine replacement
product was introduced, and covers the evolution of the market as new products are introduced
while some of the older products move from prescription to over-the-counter status.  Section IV
describes the econometric model and hypotheses to be tested and Section V presents our results.  
In the final section we summarize our results and discuss the implications for public policy and
future research.
II.  Evolution of the Market for Smoking Cessation and the Regulatory Environment 
The Market for Smoking Cessation
Since the first Surgeon General’s Report on the hazards of smoking was published in
1964, the prevalence of smoking among U.S. adults has dropped from 42 percent to about 24
percent.  To give an idea of the importance of the role of smoking cessation in this drop,
currently there are about as many former smokers (23 percent of adults) as there are current
smokers.  Put differently, the number of former smokers as a fraction of lifetime (current and
former) smokers, sometimes called the quit ratio, is now almost 50 percent, up from 30 percent
in 1965 (USDHHS 1989, 2000,  Schoenborn, Vickerie, and Barnes 2003). 
Interest in tobacco cessation has been long-standing; an advertisement for a “tobacco4Schwartz (1987, p. 47) concludes that “It is difficult to assess the true effect of hypnosis
as a treatment for smoking since the studies reported were weak in followup methodology ;”and
that “The comments regarding the methodology and evaluation of hypnosis trials...apply as well
to acupuncture.” (p. 50).  
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cure” appeared in Harper’s Weekly in 1862 (HarpWeek 2004).  However, only recently have
pharmaceutical innovations led to smoking cessation methods of proven effectiveness.  A review
of research published between 1957 to 1968 concludes that “few [methods] have shown high
success rates.” (Schwartz 1969).  Reviews of research published between 1969-1977 (Schwartz
and Rider 1977) and 1978-1985 (Schwartz 1987) identify some promising non-pharmacological
methods; but they also note deficiencies in the research design and methods that cast doubt on
the findings for methods such as hypnosis and acupuncture.
4  In contrast, based on a meta-
analysis of evidence from clinical trials, the current Public Health Service’s Clinical Practice
Guidelines concludes that “Numerous effective pharmacotherapies for smoking cessation now
exist....that reliably increase long-term smoking abstinence rates,” and identifies buproprion,
nicotine gum, nicotine inhaler, nicotine nasal spray, and the nicotine patch as first-line
pharmacotherapies (USDHHS 2000c).  The result of the meta-analysis suggest that smokers
randomly assigned to use the pharmaceutical products are 1.5 to 3 times more likely to
successfully quit than smokers in the placebo control groups.   
Table 1 documents the rapid developments in the market for pharmaceutical smoking
cessation products and its regulatory environment.  For now we will focus mainly on the history
of the product market; the regulatory history is discussed in more detail below.  From its
introduction in 1984 until 1991 nicotine gum was the only pharmaceutical product approved for
use as an aid to smoking cessation.  Over the 1990s, pharmaceutical companies competed in this7
market by introducing nicotine patches, nasal spray, and inhalers.  In addition, in 1997 the anti-
depressant buproprion was approved for smoking cessation under the name Zyban.  Varenicline,
a nicotine agonist, is currently in phase III clinical trials.  Other recent developments include
new flavors of nicotine gum, a nicotine lozenge, and  emerging competition from generic
versions of nicotine gum and patch marketed at retail establishments like Wal-Mart.  
The development of effective pharmaceutical aids for smoking cessation is changing the
way many smokers quit, and may be increasing smoking cessation rates.  As recently as 1987,
almost 90 percent of former smokers had quit ‘cold turkey,’ and only 1.5 percent had used
nicotine gum, the only nicotine replacement therapy available (USDHSS 1989).  Currently,
about twenty percent of smokers use a pharmaceutical product when they try to quit (Plassman et
al. 2005).  Two recent econometric studies examine the role of nicotine replacement therapies in
reducing aggregate tobacco consumption and increasing quitting.  Hu et al. (2000) estimate that
a 10 percent increase in sales of nicotine replacement products reduces cigarette sales by 0.04
percent.  They estimate that, when nicotine patches became available in 1992 (as opposed to
nicotine gum), cigarette sales fell by an additional 0.076 percent.  Keeler et al. (2002) estimate
that, when the FDA allowed smoking cessation products to be sold over-the-counter (OTC),
consumption of nicotine patches and gum increased 78 - 92 percent and 180 percent
respectively.  Under the assumption that the products were as effective in practice as found in
clinical trials,  they estimate the extra sales translated into almost 20,000 extra quits in 1995.  
Burton et al. (1997) study the impact of the 1996 Great American Smokeout (GASO), sponsored
by the American Cancer Society in collaboration with a manufacturer of nicotine medications. 
Using Nielsen data they estimate that paid advertisements that mentioned the GASO reached 1228
million adults.  Burton et al. (1997) also estimate that purchases of nicotine medications
increased by 11 percent around the 1996 GASO, but they can not tie that increase specifically to
the impact of GASO advertising. 
The Regulatory Environment
In addition to documenting the introduction of smoking cessation products, Table 1 also
lists two types of other important regulatory decisions that affect their advertising.  The first type
is the FDA’s decision of whether the product may be sold OTC.  During the latter half of the
1990s, the FDA moved nicotine gum and nicotine patches from prescription to over-the-counter
(OTC) status.  The second type is the FDA’s decision of how to regulate the advertising of
products that are sold by prescription only.
FDA decisions to permit firms to sell their products OTC obviously affect the product
costs faced by consumers.  Less obviously, these decisions also affect the advertising costs faced
by firms.  Advertising costs fall because advertising of OTC products carries a lower regulatory
burden than does advertising of prescription only products.
This lower regulatory burden flows from the agency with whom regulatory authority
rests for each type of product.  The FDA has regulatory authority over advertising of prescription
drugs.  That authority flows from The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) of 1938 (52 Stat.
1040; 21 U.S.C. §301, et seq.) (hereafter “the Act”).  Although the Act focuses on labeling and
does not specifically define what constitutes advertising, the Act defines labeling to include all
‘written, printed, or graphic’ materials that accompanies the product.  The FDA interpreted this
language broadly to mean that they have the authority to regulate any material associated with a
product, even if it does not physically accompany the product, as is the case for print or5 21 U.S.C. 352(n).
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broadcast advertising.  In Kordel v. United States the US Supreme Court upheld the FDA’s
interpretation and effectively granted the FDA regulatory authority over the advertisements for
prescription drugs.  Under this authority the FDA requires that advertisements for prescription
drugs must contain “other information in brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness.”
5  By contrast the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which
has regulatory authority over advertising claims for OTC products, does not require disclosures
of the above sort.  In regulating advertising, the FTC generally requires only that advertisements
are not false or deliberately misleading and that advertisers are able to substantiate claims.
FDA regulations make it more expensive to advertise prescription products because, to
meet the FDA disclosure requirements, firms must accompany each advertisement with the
sections of the labeling the FDA approved that discuss the product’s adverse event profile,
contraindications, warnings and precautions.  As seen in Figure 1, in practice the typical
advertisement of a prescription product for smoking cessation includes at least a page of fine
print disclosures.  The disclosures are not required by the FTC.
Table 1 also lists FDA’s decisions – in 1983, 1985, and 1997 – that have affected the
advertising of products that are sold by prescription only.  Over the decade of the 1970s and
early 1980s pharmaceutical firms increasingly marketed prescription drugs by advertising
directly to consumers.  In 1983, before pharmaceutical products for smoking cessation were on
the market, the FDA reacted to this trend.  The FDA asked the manufacturers to voluntarily stop
DTC advertising.  The FDA asked for this moratorium because they wanted time to study
whether or under what conditions DTC advertising might meet the statutory requirements of the6 Section 202.1(e)(5)ii of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
7 See Department of Health and Human Services: Docket No. 95N-0227
8  See Department of Health and Human Services: Docket No. 97D-0302.  It is
reasonably clear from the request for comments that the FDA was contemplating relaxed
disclosure requirements for the adequate provision elements of the regulations.
10
act.
The advertising of smoking cessation products was directly affected in 1985, when the
FDA withdrew their request for the voluntary moratorium, but simultaneously imposed
significant restrictions on DTC advertising.  In particular, the FDA required DTC advertisements
to meet the same standards as advertisements directed towards physicians.  This standard
required that advertisements that made safety and efficacy claims about a particular drug must
include a brief summary of the product’s side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness.
6  The
1985 FDA disclosure requirements applied to DTC advertisements in both print and broadcast
media.  Although the disclosure requirement for broadcast advertisements was shorter, it still had
to meet the FDA standard of being “adequate.”  Moreover, broadcast advertisements would be
required to make provisions for viewers to obtain the detailed FDA prescribing information. 
Meeting these disclosure requirements in broadcast advertisements was generally impractical.
The general regulatory environment significantly changed again in 1997, when the FDA
substantially reduced the burden of disclosure for broadcast DTC advertisements of
pharmaceuticals.  In 1995 the FDA had issued a notice of public hearing and request for
comments on the regulation of DTC advertisements.
7  Following this public hearing and the
receipt of public comments, on August 12
th, 1997 the FDA  issued draft guidance for industry
with respect to DTC advertising.
8   The intended purpose of this guidance was to “enable product9The 1997 draft guidance was amended slightly in 1999. 
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sponsors to fulfill the requirements for consumer-directed broadcast advertisements, while
providing consumers with required risk information about the advertised product.”  The
requirements for print disclosure did not change.
While the new guidance surrounding broadcast advertising did not involve any formal
regulatory action, it did create a new relatively safe harbor for manufacturers with respect to how
FDA would interpret disclosure requirements.   The 1997 FDA draft guidance continued to
require manufacturers to include in all broadcast advertisements a major statement of the most
important risks.  The guidance suggested that manufactures could meet the requirement of
providing detailed FDA prescribing information through toll-free telephone numbers, web sites,
and references to labeling information in print advertisements appearing concurrently.  The draft
guidance required that broadcast advertisements should also indicate that health care
professionals can provide additional information.
9
Many observers believe the 1997 FDA regulatory change led to a sharp increase in DTC
broadcast advertisements.  The pharmaceutical industry’s spending on DTC advertising tripled
between 1996 and 2000, increasing from $791 million to almost $2.5 billion (Rosenthal et al.
2002).  Even more dramatically, the industry’s spending on television advertising increased more
than seven-fold, from $220 million to about $1.6 billion.  Rosenthal et al. (2002) note that the
initial surge in DTC advertising preceded the FDA’s release of draft guidelines in 1997, and
suggest that these guidelines may not have been the most important reason for the overall
increase.  However, the FDA had announced a review of its approach in 1995 and some sort of
reform was generally anticipated.  Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that expenditures began to12
increase even before the more official notification in 1997 of the change in regulatory approach.  
Further regulatory changes may be in the air, but it is not clear in which direction the
regulatory winds are blowing.  In 2003, the FDA reviewed its regulatory approach to DTC
advertising.  The FDA review process included a request for comments from federal agencies,
corporations and lobbying groups with an interest in DTC regulatory matters.  The FTC’s written
comments in response to this request suggested that the FDA should drop its requirement that
pharmaceutical print advertisements include detailed drug side-effects listings, in favor of
allowing the same kind of "brief summary" risk warnings in print advertisements that are now
used in broadcast commercials.   More generally, the FTC urged the FDA not to impede DTC
pharmaceutical advertising.  In 2004, the FDA issued draft guidance suggesting that a briefer
print disclosure can be appropriate, but no final rule has been issued and it is unclear if the draft
guidance provides a safe harbor for firms to use abbreviated disclosures.
III.  Data
We use two main sources of data on DTC advertising of nine smoking cessation
products: Nicorette Gum; Nicoderm CQ Patch; Habitrol Patch; ProStep Patch; Nicotrol Patch;
Nicotrol Inhaler; Zyban (buproprion); and Commit (nicotine lozenge).  First, we use data on
advertising expenditures by product category, for both print and broadcast media.  We use the
“Media Intelligence” advertising expenditure data from Competitive Media Reporting [CMR]. 
The series runs from 1986 - 2002. The Consumer Price Index is used to express the expenditure
data in constant 2002 dollars.  
The second main source of data is an archive of pharmaceutical product DTC
advertisements in the print media.   The Smoking Cessation Advertisements (SCADS) Archive13
includes all advertisements for smoking cessation products that appeared in any issue of 26
consumer magazines and two medical journals between January 1985 and May 2002, yielding a
sample of 13,497 issues.  The data measure each advertisement’s brand, the length of
advertisement in standardized pages, and the data of the issue of each magazine in which it
appears.  The SCADS Archive is discussed in more detail in the Data Appendix.  
Figure 2 shows trends in total expenditures on smoking cessation product advertisements
from 1986 to 2002.  Advertising expenditures are fairly low from 1986 through 1991, after
which advertising expenditures spiked up to about $100 million, driven by the introduction and
intensive marketing of the first nicotine patches.   After returning to lower levels, beginning
around 1995 advertising expenditures increase again.  The 1996-1999 spike roughly coincides
with the relaxation of FDA regulations on DTC advertising in broadcast media; however it also
coincides with the introduction of new products (nicotine nasal spray, nicotine inhaler, and
buproprion), and the conversion of older products from prescription-only to OTC status.  Total
advertising expenditures hit about $200 million at their peak in 1999.  It is also notable that after
1995 the composition of expenditures shifted dramatically towards television.  In 1992, print
media advertisements account for about 80 percent of total expenditures, while broadcast media
account for only 20 percent.  In 1999, broadcast media advertisements account for about 90
percent of total expenditures.  However, advertising in both broadcast and print media initially
increase after 1995.   In the last few years of our study period, expenditures on both print and
television advertising fall. 
Figure 3 compares total advertising expenditures for the smoking cessation products with
the number of pages advertisements for each product that appear in our archive. In addition to14
helping document the trends, Figure 2 shows that there is a very strong relationship between total
advertising expenditures and the SCADS advertising data.  The first peaks in both series occur in
1992 around the introduction of the nicotine patch, with about 400 pages of archived print
advertisements for smoking cessation products.  As with expenditures, the number of pages
increases again from 1995 - 1999, peaking at about 200 pages in 1997 and 1998.  In some years
during the 1980s, our archive contains print advertisements for smoking cessation products even
though the CMR data show zero print media advertising expenditures.  This appears to be an
artifact of the CMR data, where small levels of expenditures are either missed or collapsed into a
non-itemized category.   At the very end of our study period, the CMR data show substantial
expenditures in 2002 on print media advertisements of the newly-introduced Commit nicotine
lozenge.  However, the SCADS archive ends in May 2002, before the October 2002 launch of
Commit.  For most of the period and most of the products,  the SCADS archive appears to be 
representative of the universe of all smoking cessation product advertisements in magazines.
Table 2 provides an overview of how the advertisements in the SCADS archive are
distributed across the consumer and medical magazines, and across prescription versus OTC
products.  About three quarters of  the slightly more than 1000 advertisements for smoking
cessation products appear in the 26 consumer magazines, while the two medical journals account
for the other quarter of all advertisements.  About three quarters of the advertisements are for
prescription products, with about twice as many of these advertisements appearing in the
consumer magazines than in the medical journals.   Even afer products are available OTC they
are still advertised in the medical journals, but it is clear that the advertising effort shifts more
towards the consumer magazines.  It should be kept in mind that while there are more15
advertisements for prescription products than for OTC products, for much of our sample period
there were also more prescription products on the market.   
IV.  Econometric Model of Advertising and Hypotheses to be Tested  
In this section we develop an econometric model to estimate the impact of the regulatory
environment and other market-level forces on the advertising of smoking cessation products. The
model and hypotheses to be tested are based on a profit-maximizing framework.  We follow a
standard approach and assume that a firm in an oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive
industry advertises to invest in a stock of consumer knowledge (Roberts and Samuelson 1988,
Chintagunta and Vilcassim 1994, Lee 2002, Bhattacharya and Vogt 2003).  For smoking
cessation products, advertising  may increase consumer demand both by informing consumers
about the health benefits of smoking cessation, and by informing consumers about the
availability and efficacy of the advertised product.  Advertising thus increases the firm’s total
revenues by increasing consumer demand for its product.  As Berndt et al. (1995) note, for
pharmaceutical products marginal production costs are low, so shifting out consumer demand is
essentially the same as increasing profits.
The first order conditions for profit maximization, which require that the marginal
revenues from advertising are set equal to the marginal costs of advertising, implicitly define the
firm’s input demand function for advertising.  This motivates the specification of our
econometric model given by equation (1), which can be thought of as a version of an input
demand function, where advertising demand depends on the costs of advertising and the market
environment:  
(1) Advertising p(m)t = "o +  "1 OTC Status pt + "2 (OTC Statuspt ) * (JAMA) + "3 (OTC10Our unit of observation is chosen to be the number of advertisements or pages per
month because some of the magazines in our sample are monthly magazines.  For those
magazines that are weekly we add the value of the dependent variable across the 4 (or 5) weekly
issues that have that month on the date of the publication.
11The year dummies capture general time trends as well as the degree of competition in
the market for smoking cessation products; below, we further explore the role of competition in
equation (2) by replacing the set of year dummies with a specific parameterization of the effect
of time.  In equation (1), the magazine dummies capture the price of advertising space as well as
16
Statuspt )* (NEJM)  + "4 Introductory Period pt  + $ Year Dummies  +  ( Month Dummies
 + * Magazine Dummies + . Product Dummies + epmt
We estimate equation (1) using different measures of advertising as the dependent
variable: expenditures on print media advertisements for product p in month m;   expenditures on
television advertisements for product p in month t; the number of print media advertisements for
product p in magazine m during month t; and the  number of pages of print media advertisements
for product p in magazine m during month t.
10  Our approach to understand the economic
determinants of smoking cessation product advertising exploits variation in the costs of
advertising over time and across products created by the regulatory environment.  Equation (1)
also includes sets of dummy variables for year, month, and product.  When the dependent
variables are the number and pages of magazine advertisements, the models also include a set of
magazine dummies; the dummies for the two medical journals – the Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA) and the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) – are also
interacted with the measure of OTC status.  The various dummies are included to capture other
important aspects of the market environment and the costs of advertising.
11  Table 3 provides theother aspects of a particular magazine such as total circulation and readership demographics.   
12Because of health insurance, in principle the switch to OTC can have ambiguous effects
on the return to advertising.  Insured consumers may actually see lower out-of-pocket costs when
the drug is available by prescription only.  Moreover, health insurance coverage will tend to
make demand more price inelastic, increasing manufacturers’ expected returns on advertising
(Danzon and Pauly 2002, pp. 608-609).   For some drugs, therefore, a switch to OTC status may
reduce demand and make demand more price elastic, thus reducing the returns to advertising. 
However, health insurance coverage of prescription drugs for smoking cessation was uncommon
for most of the period we study (McPhillips-Tangum 1998, National Center for Health Statistics
2001), and empirical evidence suggests that the switch of these drugs to OTC status shifted the
demand curve out (Keeler et al. 2002).
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means of the dependent and independent variables.
We hypothesize that the marketing status of the product (prescription versus OTC) will
be an important factor in a firm’s decision to advertise.  In our empirical models, we capture this
aspect of the regulatory environment by the variable OTC Status pt..   This variable indicates if
product p at time t is available over-the-counter.  OTC status is hypothesized to generate a
number of influences, most of which will tend to increase advertising.  First, we expect an own-
price effect: the removal of disclosure requirements lowers the costs of advertisements and thus
increases firms’ demand for advertising.  Second, by eliminating the need to see a physician,
OTC status lowers the full costs consumers face to obtain smoking cessation products, which can
be expected to increase consumer demand, thus increasing the returns to advertising.
12  Third,
OTC status may make advertising more effective: because firms are no longer required to
disclose side effects so prominently, consumers may be more likely to respond to
advertisements.  A change to OTC status may also work in the other direction and cause certain
types of advertising to decrease.  A cross-price effect might tend to decrease magazine
advertising: because OTC status decreases the relative cost of television advertising, firms may18
substitute away from magazine advertising into television.  Finally, we expect that OTC status
reduces the returns to advertising targeted at physicians, so in the models of the number and
pages of magazine advertisements we include interactions with the dummy variables for the two
medical journals (JAMA and NEJM). 
The FDA also influences the market for smoking cessation advertising through its initial
approval to allow new products on the market.  Equation (1) includes a variable Introductory
Period pt, which is defined as the six month period following approval.   This allows us to test
Bhattacharya and Vogt’s (2003) theoretical prediction that pharmaceutical advertising levels are
set high early in the product’s life cycle to build public knowledge about the product. 
To further explore the economic determinants of advertising choices, we re-specify
equation (1) by replacing the set of year dummies with a specific parameterization of the effect
of time:
(2) Advertising pmt = "o +  "1 OTC Status pt + "2 (OTC Statuspt ) * (JAMA) + "3 (OTC Statuspt
)* (NEJM)  + "4 Introductory Period pt  + $1 Number of products on markett +  $2
(Number of products on markett )
2 +  $3 Post 1997 Regulations + $4 (Rx Statuspt ) * (Post
1997 Regulations) + ( Month Dummies  + * Magazine Dummies + . Product Dummies
+ epmt
To capture the potential impact of brand competition on the returns to advertising,
equation (2) includes the number of smoking cessation products on the market at time t, and the
square of this measure.    This allows us to test the conventional wisdom about the relationship
between competition and advertising –  “the so-called inverted U hypothesis, which implies that19
moderately concentrated industries engage more intensively in advertising than both
atomistically competitive and highly concentrated industries.”  (Lee 2002, pp. 89 - 90).  In other
contexts, the measures of the market environment might be endogenous to advertising levels, but
this does not seem likely in the market for smoking cessation products.  An incumbent’s
advertising might discourage entry (Schmalensee 1983), reducing the number of products on the
market.  Scott Morton’s  (2000) empirical analysis suggests that brand advertising is not a barrier
to entry by generic firms into the U.S. pharmaceutical market.  Over most of the period we study,
entry into the market for smoking cessation products did not involve generics but instead
involved the introduction of new branded products.  Introduction of these products was the last
step of a long process of development and testing begun long before current advertising could be
known.  The exact timing of FDA approval is also not a choice variable of the firm.  For this
reasons, we believe it is appropriate to treat the measures of the market environment as
exogenous to current advertising choices.
Equation (2) also introduces another regulatory variable, Post 1997t , which indicates if
the observed advertisement occurs after the FDA 1997 regulatory change for broadcast
advertising.  By lowering the cost of broadcast advertising, we predict own-price effects that will
increase the demand for television advertising and possible cross-price effects to reduce demand
for magazine advertising.  Because the 1997 regulatory change applied to prescription products,
Post 1997t is interacted with an indicator variable for whether the product is available only by
prescription at time t.
To estimate our models of advertising expenditures, we use a sample of 998 observations
of the advertising expenditures for each product in each month it was on the market from13The dependent variables for these models are counts of the number of advertisements
and the number of pages of advertisements.  The Poisson model, an extension of the regression
model that is appropriate when the dependent variable is a count rather than a continuous
variable, relies on restrictive assumptions that are problematic for our data.  For example, about
98 percent of the observations of the number of advertisements take the value of zero, while the
nonzero values range from 1 to 10.  This suggests there may be “excess zeros” and/or
“overdispersion” (Mullahy 1997, Wooldridge 2002).  Wooldridge (2002, p. 651) cautions that
“In the case of overdispersion, the standard errors [on the coefficients from the standard Poisson
model] ... will systematically underestimate the asymptotic standard deviations, sometimes by a
large factor.”  We therefore adopt OLS as a more conservative approach.  We have also
collapsed the dependent variables to 0-1 measures of any advertisements or any pages.  Probit
models using these variables yield similar results to the OLS models reported; the probit results
are available upon request.    
20
January 1985 to December 2002.  The models are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
We also estimate a two part model, where the first part is a probit model of the probability that
advertising expenditures were positive, and the second part is an OLS model of the log of
expenditures for the sub-sample with positive expenditures.  When we estimate models of
magazine advertisements, our sample consists of the number (pages) of advertisements that
appear in each SCADS magazine in each month a product was on the market from January 1985
to May 2002.  Our SCADS sample consists of 25,021 observations.  We estimate the models of
the number and pages of magazine advertisements by OLS.
13
V.  Results
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of equations (1) and (2) for our models of advertising
expenditures; Table 6 presents estimates of equations (1) and (2) for our models of the number
and pages of magazine advertisements.  The results suggest that a firm’s decision to advertise is
significantly affected by FDA regulation of whether a product is available by prescription-only
or OTC.  OTC status is associated with an increase in expenditures for advertising in both
magazines and television.  For magazine advertising, the two-part model results suggest that21
most of the effect is through the probability of any expenditures rather than on the amount of
expenditures conditional on positive advertising.  For television advertising, OTC status is
associated with an increase in both parts of the expenditures model.  In Table 6, OTC status is
also associated with an increase in the number of magazine advertisements and an increase in the
pages of advertisements, although the latter effect is not quite statistically significant when the
year dummies are replaced with the parameterized time trend.   Not surprisingly, when a product
becomes available OTC, manufacturers reduce the number and pages of advertisements for that
product in the two medical journals (JAMA and NEJM).  
Because OTC magazine advertisements no longer include the full page of disclosures, it
would have been possible for manufactures to increase the number of advertisements while
holding constant or even decreasing total expenditures and the pages of advertisements.  The fact
that  total expenditures and the number of pages of advertisements instead actually increase
suggest that advertising demand is quite responsive to the own-price effects and other influences
created by OTC status.
To shed more light on the practical significance of the OTC effect, we can use our
models to predict the amount of magazine advertising under two hypothetical policy regimes. 
The first, admittedly radical, simulated policy change assumes that the FDA allowed all products
to be immediately sold OTC rather than by prescription only.  This would result in an
approximate tripling of the number of observations of OTC products in our sample.  Our model
predicts that  this change would increase the number of advertisements for smoking cessation
products by 80 percent, from 1069 to 1921 total advertisements.  Our second simulation
considers a much more modest change.  Suppose that, for each product currently sold OTC, the22
FDA approved it for OTC sale exactly one year before the actual approval date.  This
hypothetical policy change would increase the number of observations of OTC products by about
twenty percent.  According to our model, this change would increase the number of magazine
advertisements by a little less than nine percent, from 1069 to 1160 advertisements.
Our results also show that the FDA’s decisions to approve new products affects
advertising in two ways: through initial advertising during the introductory period; and through
effects on market competition.  All of the models reported in Tables 4, 5 and 6 show a large
introduction effect.  Consistent with the prediction of Bhattacharya and Vogt (2003), advertising
is much higher during the 6 month introductory period.  We also find that when a product vies
against more competing products, firms advertise more, but the increase in advertising associated
with each additional competitor falls as more products come onto the market.  This result fits the
inverted-U hypothesis.  During the period under study, the market for smoking cessation
products evolved from a highly concentrated industry (when nicotine gum was the only approved
pharmaceutical product on the market) into a less concentrated industry.  The estimated
coefficients from our model imply that the maximum amount of advertising occurs with about
four to five products on the market, a level of competition reached around the time several
different manufacturers introduced the nicotine patch in 1991 - 1992.  Although the introduction
effect and the competition effect are affected by FDA regulatory decisions, it is hard to develop
reasonable counter-factuals for policy simulations.  That is, earlier or later FDA approval would
change the timing of the introduction effect and the date when advertising is maximized, but
would not necessarily change the total advertising over the entire period.    
Results in Table 5 show that the 1997 regulatory change increased expenditures on23
television advertising of prescription smoking cessation products.  Because the 1997 regulatory
change made it much easier to advertise on television, this pattern is expected and is consistent
with other research (Rosenthal et al. 2002).  However, the results in Tables 4 and 6 do not
provide consistent evidence of a strong impact of the 1997 regulatory change on the demand for
magazine advertising.  This may not be that surprising because the current regulatory
environment  tends to induce a complementarity between the two forms of advertising.   Some
types of advertisements for prescription products on television must refer the customer to a print
advertisement – where the full disclosure continues to be required.   
Although not reported in the Tables, we also estimated equation (1) parameter vectors $,
(, * and . corresponding to the vectors of year, month, magazine, and product dummy variables. 
An interesting pattern from these estimates is that advertising is highest in January and
November.  This pattern suggest that the manufacturers of smoking cessation products may
perceive greater returns to advertising in months when smokers are pre-disposed to quit because
of New Year’s resolutions and the Great American Smokeout.  There also seems to be evidence
of ‘summer doldrums,’ with less advertising of the products in June, July and August. 
VII.  Conclusion  
Our results provide strong evidence that a switch to OTC status is associated with
increased advertising of smoking cessation products.  This evidence sheds new light on the
FTC’s December 2003 recommendation that the FDA should change its disclosure requirements
for pharmaceutical print advertisements.   If the FDA adopts this recommendation, requirements
for all DTC advertisements of prescription pharmaceuticals would be similar to current
requirements for advertisements of OTC products.  Our results suggest the new regulatory stance14There is some concern that non-smokers will use nicotine replacement products. 
Because virtually all of the adverse health consequences of smoking are due to the inhaled
smoke, and not the nicotine per se, it is not clear that this small potential cost of advertising
smoking cessation products could outweigh the benefits of increased cessation.  
24
could substantially increase DTC advertising of pharmaceuticals.
Of course, there are different views of whether more DTC advertising of pharmaceuticals
will improve consumer welfare.   The general debate on DTC advertising is beyond the scope of
this paper.  However, it should be noted that standard objections to DTC advertising do not seem
to carry as much weight in the context of smoking cessation products.  For example, a common
concern is that patients may incorrectly self-diagnose and pressure physicians for inappropriate
prescriptions for non-existent conditions.  Such a situation seems unlikely for smokers.
14   The
wide availability of nicotine replacement products in the late 1990s has been credited with
producing “the largest increase in smoking cessation since the 1964 Surgeon General’s report on
smoking.” (Hughes 2000, p. 147).  Because de-regulating the advertising of smoking cessation
products is likely to help more smokers quit, such a regulatory change can also improve public
health.  In on-going work, we are exploring whether advertising of smoking cessation products
translates into more ex-smokers.  The results of our on-going research will allow us to quantify
the public health benefits of changes to the FDA’s DTC advertising regulations.25
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TABLE 1:  Events in the Development and Advertising of Smoking Cessation Products
Year Event
1983 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requests voluntary moratorium on direct-to-consumer
(DTC)  advertising of prescription drugs
1984 Nicorette© Gum (2 mg) approved for prescription sale (January)
1985 FDA lifts moratorium on DTC advertising (with significant restrictions).
1991 Nicoderm© CQ Patch approved for prescription sale (September)
Habitrol© Patch approved for prescription sale (September)
1992 ProStep© Patch approved for prescription sale (January)
Nicorette© Gum (4 mg) approved for prescription sale (June)
Nicotrol© Patch approved for prescription sale (August)
1994 Nicorette© Gum patent expires
1995 FDA invites comments on adequate disclosure requirements (August)
1996 Nicorette© Gum (2 and 4 mg) approved for over-the-counter (OTC) sale (February)
Nicotrol© Nasal Spray approved for prescription sale (March)
Nicotrol© Patch approved for OTC sale (July)
Nicoderm© CQ Patch approved for OTC sale (August)
1997 Nicotrol© Inhaler approved for prescription sale (May)
Zyban© approved for prescription sale (May)
FDA relaxes disclosure requirements governing DTC advertising of prescription drugs on
television and radio
1998 Nicorette Mint© Gum (2 and 4 mg) approved for OTC sale (December)
1999 ProStep© Patch approved for OTC sale (January)
Nicotrol© Gum (2 and 4 mg) approved for OTC sale (March)
Habitrol© Patch approved for OTC sale (November)
Combined Zyban© / Nicotine transdermal systems patch therapy approved for prescription sale 
2000 Nicorette Orange© Gum (2 and 4 mg) approved for OTC sale (September)
2002 Commit Lozenge© approved for OTC sale (October)
2003 Federal Trade Commission comments on FDA regulatory approach to DTC advertisements
(December)
Source: authors’ compilation from Food and Drug Administration archives.  Lists of drug approval dates and
dates for movements to OTC status were obtained from the website http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7approvl.html
and from various newspaper and journal articles.  Regulatory events surrounding direct-to-consumer advertising
are obtained from press releases on the FDA website and federal register documents.34
TABLE  2: Smoking Cessation Product Advertisements by Magazine Type and OTC
Status
Consumer Magazines Medical Journals Total
Prescription Products 531 243 774
OTC Products 245 50 295
Total 776 293 1069
Source: SCADS archive.  Consumer Magazines include: Ebony, National Geographic, Better
Homes & Gardens, Sports Illustrated, Readers Digest, Time, Money, Modern Maturity,
Family Circle, Women's Day, Cosmopolitan, YM, Rolling Stone, Good Housekeeping,
Playboy, Glamour, Vibe, Seventeen, Newsweek, Jet, Business Week, TV Guide, People, U.S.
News &World Report, Entertainment Weekly, McCall's/Rosie and Essence.  Medical Journals
include: Journal of the American Medical Association and the New England Journal of
Medicine.  35
TABLE  3:  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean
Expenditures on magazine advertising
(million $)
271.32
Expenditures on television advertising
(million $) 
925.17
Number of magazine advertisements 0.043
Pages of magazine advertisements 0.081
OTC 0.357
Introductory period 0.053
Number of products on market 6.746
Post 1997 0.515
Post 1997 * Rx Product 0.203
Notes: The mean of the first two variables in the table are derived from the
expenditure data with a sample size of 998.  The mean of the remaining
variables in the table are derived from the SCADS data with a sample size of
25,021.  36
TABLE 4:  Models of Magazine Advertising Expenditures
With Year Effects Parameterized Time Trend
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Number of products on
market – squared


















Month effects?  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects?  Yes  Yes Yes  No No No 
Product effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.256 0.343 0.415 0.170 0.241 0.285
Mean of dependent var. 271.32 0.251 6.365 271.32 0.251 6.365
N 998 916 250 998 916 250
Absolute values of t-ratios in parenthesis.  Probit results are the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability that expenditures > 0.  In probit models,
product 8 predicted failure perfectly, so it was dropped eliminating 82 observations. * (**)(***) indicates significance at 90, 95, and 99 % level respectively.37
TABLE 5:  Models of Television Advertising Expenditures
With Year Effects  Parameterized Time Trend 
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Number of products on
market – squared


















Month effects?  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year effects?  Yes  Yes Yes  No No No 
Product effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.444 0.430 0.514 0.472 0.374 0.334
Mean of dependent var. 925.17 0.310 6.740 925.17 0.310 6.740
N 998 916 309 998 916 309
Notes:  t-ratios in parenthesis.  Probit results are the marginal effects of the independent variable on the probability that expenditures > 0. In probit models, product 8
predicted failure perfectly, so it was dropped eliminating 82 observations. * (**)(***) indicates significance at 90, 95, and 99% level respectively.38
TABLE 6: Models of the Number and Pages of Magazine Advertisements
























































Month effects?  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects?  Yes  No  Yes No 
Magazine effects? Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Product effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0727 0.0621 0.0879 0.0625
Mean of dependent var. 0.0427 0.0809
N 25,021
Notes: :  t-ratios in parenthesis. * (**)(***) indicates significance at 90, 95, and 99 % level respectively.39
Figure 1
A Typical Advertisement for a Prescription 
Smoking Cessation Product
(Not available in this draft)40
Figure 2






























































































































Source: SCADS data archive and CMR/TNS Media 
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DATA APPENDIX: The SCADS Archive
In constructing the sample of magazines in SCADS, we faced a tradeoff between the benefits of
wider coverage and the costs of data collection.  To select the sample of magazines we used data
from the 1998 National Consumer Survey of the Simmons Survey of Media and Markets:
Choices II (NCS).  These data contain self-reported information on readership of 172 magazines
for approximately 20,000 consumers.  Using these data, we defined groups based on
demographic characteristics (race, education, income, age, gender, smoking status).  We then
chose the ten magazines most frequently read by members of each group.  Because of substantial
overlap in the set of magazines most frequently read by different groups, our final sample of
magazines includes 26 consumer magazines.  In the three cases in which we could not locate
copies of all magazines in our sample period (1985-2002) we substituted the magazine that was
the next most widely read magazine for the group in question.  Based on the NCS data, we
calculate that readership of the SCADS sample of 26 magazines accounts for 57.5 percent of the
readership of the NCS total sample of 172 magazines.   From a source independent of the NCS,
we also obtained data on the circulation of 148 of those magazines.  The circulation of the 26
magazines in the SCADS sample accounts for 60.7 percent of the total circulation of the 148
magazines.  While there are some magazines not included in either the NCS sample or the
circulation data, the missing magazines are not widely read; for example, only 0.001 of the NCS
respondents read the 172
nd ranked magazine in that sample.  Thus, two independent calculations
suggest that the SCADS sample accounts for almost sixty percent of all U.S. magazines by
readership or circulation. 
   
The advertising data archive includes digitally extracted images of all advertisements for
smoking products, smoking cessation products, pharmaceutical products, and health-related
public service announcements in 28 of the top read magazines in the U.S. for the period January
1985 through May 2002 (17 years and 5 months). Twenty-six of these magazines cover the
consumer market and two publications focus primarily on physicians.
Consumer magazines: Ebony, National Geographic, Better Homes & Gardens, Sports
Illustrated, Readers Digest, Time, Money, Modern Maturity, Family Circle, Women's
Day, Cosmopolitan, YM, Rolling Stone, Good Housekeeping, Playboy, Glamour, Vibe,
Seventeen, Newsweek, Jet, Business Week, TV Guide, People, U.S. News &World
Report, Entertainment Weekly, McCall's/Rosie, Essence.
Physician journals: Journal of the American Medical Association, New England Journal
of Medicine. 
 
The archive contains advertisements from approximately 13,497 issues of these magazines.  Each
advertisement in the data base  is coded with the brand name, manufacturer name, length of
advertisement, position within the magazine, and for public service announcements, who
sponsored the announcement.  43
 